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ABSTRACT 
PROTECTING NETWORK PROCESSORS WITH HIGH PERFORMANCE LOGIC 
BASED MONITORS 
 
MAY 2013 
 
HARIKRISHNAN KUMARAPILLAI CHANDRIKAKUTTY 
 
 B.Tech, COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING, TRIVANDRUM, INDIA 
 
M.S. E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Russell G. Tessier 
 
Technological advancements have transformed the way people interact with the world. 
The Internet now forms a critical infrastructure that links different aspects of our life like 
personal communication, business transactions, social networking, and advertising.  In order 
to cater to this ever increasing communication overhead there has been a fundamental shift in 
the network infrastructure. Modern network routers often employ software programmable 
network processors instead of ASIC-based technology for higher throughput performance and 
adaptability to changing resource requirements. This programmability makes networking 
infrastructure vulnerable to new class of network attacks by compromising the software on 
network processors. This issue has resulted in the need for security systems which can 
monitor the behavior of network processors at run time.  
This thesis describes an FPGA-based security monitoring system for multi-core 
network processors. The implemented security monitor improves upon previous hardware 
monitoring schemes. We demonstrate a state machine based hardware programmable monitor 
which can track program execution flow at run time. Applications are analyzed offline and a 
hash of the instructions is generated to form a state machine sequence. If the state machine 
deviates from expected behavior, an error flag is raised, forcing a network processor reset. 
vi 
 
For testing purposes, the monitoring logic along with the multi-core network processor 
system is implemented in FPGA logic. In this research, we modify the network processor 
memory architecture to improve security monitor functionality. The efficiency of this 
approach is validated using a diverse set of network benchmarks. Experiments are performed 
on the prototype system using known network attacks to test the performance of the 
monitoring subsystem. Experimental results demonstrate that out security monitor approach 
provides an efficient monitoring system in detecting and recovering from network attacks 
with minimum overhead while maintaining line rate packet forwarding. Additionally, our 
monitor is capable of defending against attacks on processor with a Harvard architecture, the 
dominant contemporary network processor organization. We demonstrate that our monitor 
architecture provides no network slowdown in the absence of an attack and provides the 
capability to drop packets without otherwise affecting regular network traffic when an attack 
occurs. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Communication is an essential aspect of modern human society. Rapid advancements 
in modern technology have brought about significant improvements in fields of personal 
communication, business transactions, entertainment, and digital government. The Internet 
forms a central aspect in many of these communication requirements. This ever growing 
dependence on the Internet has resulted in the need to improve different attributes of 
communication infrastructure like network functionality, throughput performance, reliability 
and security. The growth of Internet usage based on data from the International 
Telecommunications Union is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Internet Users per 100 Inhabitants [1] 
 
There has been a fundamental shift in network infrastructure in order to support the 
need for high performance routing resources. Network routers constitute the core of network 
infrastructure and perform most of the packet processing applications.  The lack of flexibility, 
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programmability and manageability of existing network routers, implemented using 
application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) technology, highlights the need to consider 
other networking infrastructures. The need to experiment and adapt newer networking 
protocols and services has resulted in a shift to software programmable network processor 
based systems [29]. Network processors [10] have multiple processor cores that can be 
programmed to adapt to different networking requirements. The software programmability of 
network processor also makes it vulnerable to network attacks. This inherent vulnerability 
can be exploited to generate in-network denial of service attacks, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Attack on packet processing system in network router data plane [33] 
 
The existing network security mechanisms for end systems like virus scanners and 
firewalls are not suitable for network processor based systems since these mechanisms need 
3 
 
the support of operating systems. Network processors can benefit from dedicated monitors 
that can quickly and efficiently detect attacks with minimum resource overhead. A novel 
hardware based monitoring strategy has been proposed to reduce the vulnerability of network 
processor based systems [2] [3]. These hardware monitors keep track of program execution 
flow in the processor. Processor operation is compared to expected program behavior using 
information stored in the monitor memory. Any deviation from the expected behavior is 
detected and suitable recovery procedures are initiated.  The experimental results highlight 
the benefits of using hardware monitors for monitoring network processor systems, like fast 
attack detection and low overhead.  
Although the potential of hardware security monitors has been demonstrated in 
previous approaches, there is still room for improvement in terms of monitor detection 
accuracy, resource utilization and attack detection speed. Moreover, in multi-core network 
processor systems, there is an opportunity for sharing monitor resources when multiple 
processors execute the same application. In this document we present a programmable logic 
based monitoring system for monitoring multi-core network processor systems. The specific 
contributions of this work are: 
1. The design of a high-performance programmable security monitor which uses hashes of 
network processor instructions to detect unintended processor behaviour. The application 
is analyzed offline and an efficient state machine is created which tracks program 
execution during runtime. If an expected sequence of instructions (represented as hash 
values) is not followed, an execution error is detected. The state machine can be 
implemented as either a non-deterministic finite automaton (NFA) or a deterministic finite 
automaton (DFA). In this research, we investigate security monitors based on DFA state 
machine implementations [6] [7]. 
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2. A single-core network processor system with security monitor is implemented on an 
Altera DE4 system. The competence of our proposed system to detect known network 
attacks is evaluated. 
3. We evaluated the resource requirements and throughput performance of our proposed 
architecture using a diverse set of networking benchmarks [43].  
4. Network attacks on network processors based on Harvard architecture [47] are 
considered. We demonstrate an in-network attack through the data plane of the network 
that exploits an integer overflow vulnerability to smash the processor stack and launch a 
return-to-library attack. This attack propagates the attack packet and crashes the processor 
system. We also show that our hardware monitor is effective in defending against this 
attack and allowing for continued router operation after attack identification and recovery. 
1.1. Organization of the document 
The rest of the thesis document is organized as follow. Chapter 2 provides a detailed 
overview on the general background of network processors, hardware security monitors and 
the related work in this field. Chapter 3 describes two previous hardware security monitoring 
approaches and the subsequent improvements introduced in the work. Chapter 4 describes the 
four-core system architecture with security monitors. Chapter 5 explains the experimental 
setup for testing the prototype system. Chapter 6 discusses the benchmarks and the obtained 
results. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with directions for future work.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
In this chapter, an overview of the technologies needed to perform the proposed 
research is provided. These technologies include field-programmable gate array (FPGA) 
chips, embedded systems based on FPGAs, and network processors.  
2.1. Field-programmable gate array 
 A field-programmable gate array is a semiconductor device that can be programmed 
by a user after it is manufactured. FPGAs contain programmable components called logic 
blocks and a hierarchy of interconnect elements (wires) which can be configured to connect 
these logic blocks, as illustrated in Figure 3. Hardware description languages (HDL), such as 
Verilog and VHDL, can be used to configure the device for implementing specific 
applications. Modern FPGAs also provide high speed transceivers, embedded memory blocks 
and high-speed I/Os that help perform complex computational operations [8].  Compared to 
application specific integrated technology, FPGAs allow for rapid prototyping, faster 
debugging, ability for easy reprogramming and shorter time to market.  
 
Figure 3: Structure of an FPGA [9] 
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2.2. Network Processors 
The tremendous growth of modern communication infrastructure, such as the Internet, 
has resulted in the need for networking resources that can meet high throughput performance, 
flexibility and security. Even though general purpose processors (GPP) can support newly-
introduced networking protocols and services, they often do not provide high throughput 
performance. ASIC processors can provide high throughput but generally do not allow 
straightforward functionality changes. Network processors (NP) represent the design space 
between these two approaches, as illustrated in Figure 4.   
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Figure 4: Processor design space 
Network processors have multiple embedded processor cores which are software 
programmable to provide real time programmability and high throughput performance. The 
architecture of a simple network processor is illustrated in Figure 5. 
Network processors consist of multiple processing elements and memory units 
connected by an on-chip network [10]. A control system determines the interaction between 
processors and memory elements and the processing required. Based on the workload, 
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software on network processors can be changed to adapt to the processor operation. There are 
different performance metrics that need to be considered while designing network processors 
like cost, throughput performance, and power [11] [12]. With promising technologies, like 
network virtualization, for future internet architectures emerging, significant research is 
ongoing on network processor based systems [13] [14] [15].  
 
 
Figure 5: Simple network processor architecture 
2.3. Secure monitoring 
  The software programmability of network processors raises a serious security 
concern. Network processor systems are vulnerable to network attacks that can remotely 
exploit their programmable nature. In this section, we look at some network attacks and the 
existing monitoring techniques for guarding against these attacks. 
2.3.1. Network attacks 
Network attacks [16] [17] [18] [19] exploit the vulnerabilities in network systems.   
Sniffing or snooping are network attacks which allow intruders to listen to or interpret traffic. 
If packets are not properly encrypted, sniffing attacks can give a full view of the ongoing 
communications. This attack can be used to read the data or cause the network to crash or 
become corrupted. Distributed denial-of-service attacks [20] occur when an attacker takes 
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control of a large number of machines and installs attack software in them. These machines 
can then be used to bombard target attack sites with a large number of messages. This attack 
can result in preventing normal system usage and can also lead to the abnormal behavior of 
applications or services. Identity spoofing is another common network attack. Here, an 
attacker uses special programs to construct IP packets that appear to originate from valid 
addresses. This attack can also be used in combination with denial-of service attacks. The 
attacker can first take down an existing network connection between two end systems by 
denial of service attacks. A new connection can then be initiated with one of the end systems 
by sequence number guessing. The attackers can then modify, reroute or delete the data after 
taking control of network traffic. A routing attack is another kind of network attack which 
reroutes network traffic through attack systems.  
2.3.2. Software based monitoring techniques 
There are many existing software techniques for protecting network systems against 
attacks. Firewalls [21] and virus scanners are the most common solutions for Internet security 
[22]. Firewalls help in filtering out traffic that might be harmful. This filtering can happen at 
IP packet level, TCP session level or at the application level. Firewalls examine incoming 
packets and filters out malformed or attack packets. They are useful against spoofing attacks 
and denial-of-service attacks. Virus scanners are examples of intrusion detection systems [23]. 
These systems are devices or software applications that detect the presence of malicious 
traffic or services. Firewalls try to prevent intrusions which originate from outside the 
network. Intrusion detection systems detect suspected intrusions that have taken place and 
look for attacks being generating from inside the network. Another security measure is the 
use of encrypted packets for data communication. Here, cryptographic techniques are used to 
encrypt the data while in transmit. Communication is implemented using Internet Protocol 
Security (IPSec), a set of open Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards. The 
9 
 
encrypted packets have the same format as unencrypted packets and they are transmitted on 
the existing network framework.  
2.3.3.  Hardware based monitoring techniques 
 Existing security mechanisms, like virus scanners and firewalls, generally require 
powerful processors and operating systems. These resources are generally not associated with 
network routers on programmable network processors. Instead, hardware monitors can be 
used to protect network processors against vulnerabilities, as illustrated in Figure 6. Monitors 
use run time processing information to look for deviations from expected processor behavior. 
If an attack occurs, a deviation from the expected behavior is detected and a suitable recovery 
process is initiated. In this thesis project, we introduce a new programmable logic based 
security monitoring technique for detecting network attacks. In the next two sections we 
describe two FPGA-based systems which can be used to prototype such a system. 
 
Figure 6: Network processor system with hardware monitor 
2.4. NetFPGA 1G Infrastructure 
The NetFPGA 1G [24] is a programmable platform for networking research that can 
operate at 1 Gbits per second line rate. The platform is actively used in networking research 
with more than 2000 boards deployed worldwide. The system includes a Xilinx Virtex II pro 
[25] based FPGA which can be configured to perform different networking applications. 
These applications include a reference router, a packet generator, and a network interface. 
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2.5. Altera DE4 NetFPGA infrastructure 
Although the NetFPGA 1G is widely used, its logic capacity is limited, making it 
unsuitable for research for this project. The Altera DE4 NetFPGA [37] platform is a suitable 
alternative. This infrastructure will be heavily used for this thesis project. Important 
components of the design including the Altera DE4 board, the DE4 NetFPGA software 
infrastructure, and the reference router and packet generator modules, are described 
subsequently since they are referenced in our discussion of the proposed security architecture 
in coming chapters.  
2.5.1. Altera DE4 FPGA board 
The Altera DE4 FPGA board [26] is a research platform featuring an Altera Stratix IV 
FPGA [27].  The DE4 board which will be used to complete the work described in this thesis 
is shown in Figure 7. The main features of the DE4 board are: 
 Stratix IV FPGA with 5x more logic and memory resources compared to a NetFPGA 1G 
platform. 
 PCI Express interface which allow for faster host PC to FPGA data transfers. 
 Up to 8GB external DDR2 memory . 
2.5.2. Altera DE4 NetFPGA Infrastructure 
Altera DE4 NetFPGA is an open source port of the NetFPGA 1G infrastructure to an 
Altera DE4 board. The DE4 NetFPGA provides network researchers with a powerful open 
platform to build complex network applications. A high-level view of the DE4 NetFPGA 
architecture is illustrated in Figure 8.  We have successfully migrated the NetFPGA reference 
router [44] and packet generator [45] designs to the Altera DE4 platform.  
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Figure 7: Altera DE4 board 
 
 
Figure 8: Altera DE4 NetFPGA Architecture 
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2.5.3. Altera DE4 NetFPGA reference router 
The Altera DE4 reference router system integrates the NetFPGA reference router 
pipeline with Altera DE4 NetFPGA platform. The Altera DE4 NetFPGA reference router 
system is illustrated in the Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Reference router pipeline 
 
The incoming packets from DE4 GigE MAC ports are stored in input queues (MAC 
RxQ and CPU RxQ). The input arbiter then forwards these packets to the output port lookup 
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2.5.4. Altera DE4 NetFPGA packet generator 
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transmit and receive statistics. The Altera NetFPGA packet generator is used for testing the 
prototype system functionality, as explained in section 5.2. 
2.6. Related work 
Modern high-speed network infrastructures utilize network processors since they offer 
sophisticated packet processing capabilities and advanced protocol functionality. The 
programmable nature of network processors allows for experimentation with new 
architectures and protocols [10]. Research projects have examined improving network 
processor throughput, resource management, power analysis, packet classification, and 
deployment [28] [29]. Network processor based routers are commercially deployed by many 
major device vendors (e.g., Intel IXP2400 [30], Cisco QuantumFlow [31], Cavium Octeon 
[32]). 
Network processor systems are vulnerable to remote attacks that target the software 
on the processors. Chasaki et al. [33] demonstrated how network processor systems can be 
exploited to launch denial-of-service attacks by using a single malformed packet. Protecting a 
network infrastructure against such malicious attacks is an important concern in network 
processor design. Hardware-assisted run-time monitoring techniques have been used in 
protecting embedded processors. Arora et al. [4] [34] showed how dedicated hardware 
monitors can be used to track and prevent unintended program behavior. The hardware 
monitor observes the run time execution of the processor and compares it with statically 
analyzed expected program behavior. Unexpected behavior is used to initiate appropriate 
response mechanisms. Mao et al. [35] used hardware monitors with offline analyzed control 
flow graph information to protect embedded processors.  
The embedded nature of network processors allows for the use of hardware 
monitoring schemes against in-system attacks. Wolf et al. [36] proposed using a secure 
packet processing platform for network processors with hardware monitors. Using offline 
14 
 
analyzed monitoring graphs, the program execution of packet processors can be monitored 
for attacks and suitable recovery measures taken. Chasaki et al. [2] have implemented a 
hardware security monitoring model that can detect known network attacks.  
2.7. Summary 
This chapter introduced several concepts that are essential for understanding the 
prototype system. We provide an overview of the Altera DE4 NetFPGA infrastructure used 
for development and testing of the prototype system. Although hardware security monitoring 
systems for network processors exist, there is still potential for improvement. The next 
chapter outlines two specific previous monitoring approaches that are limited in their 
capabilities. Subsequent chapters describe enhancements to overcome these limitations.  
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CHAPTER 3 
SECURITY MONITOR SYSTEM REVIEW 
 This chapter introduces two previous hardware security monitoring techniques for 
network processors. We will first look at the implementation details of an existing hardware 
security monitor [2]. The limitations of this hardware security monitor motivate us to develop 
a programmable hardware security monitor. We will compare the advantages and drawbacks 
of these two security monitoring approaches. Based on these observations, we outline the 
important security monitoring features implemented in the new monitoring system presented 
in this thesis.  
To provide a basis for comparing the two approaches, we state the main design 
challenges that need to be met when using hardware security monitors.  
1. Correct detection: The monitoring system needs to correctly identify malicious attacks. 
There is a variety of information available for security monitors to keep track of processor 
operation at run time: 
 Instruction address: The security monitor can follow the instruction addresses of 
the application binary, since the feasible address sequences can often be 
predetermined. 
 Opcode: The security monitor can track the operations performed by the 
processor. 
 Instruction hash: The monitor can use a sequence of instruction hash values to 
verify processor behaviour.  
The main tradeoff for choosing a monitoring strategy depends on the availability of 
hardware resources and the difficulty in defeating the effectiveness of the monitoring 
behavior by an attacker. The security monitor can utilize one or more of the above 
mentioned monitoring options to correctly detect unintended behavior. 
16 
 
2. Resource overhead: Security monitors need to be designed while considering the limited 
resource availability of their implementation platform. Increasing the resource usage can 
adversely affect power consumption and design complexity. 
3. Fast detection: Programmable network processor operation can be changed by altering the 
software on the processor. Hence, it is desirable to detect malicious behaviour quickly, 
preferably within one or a small number of clock cycles. 
3.1 Address-based hardware security monitor system 
An address-based hardware security monitor [2] uses instruction address information 
for monitoring processor behavior. The processor application binary is analyzed offline and 
instructions are classified into different basic blocks. Each basic block represents a set of 
instructions, before a branch instruction is encountered as illustrated in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10: Basic block representation 
The fifth instruction is a conditional jump instruction, and hence all instructions from 
memory locations 1 to 5 represent basic block zero. Similarly, instruction eight is an 
unconditional jump instruction. All instructions from memory locations 6 to 8 represent basic 
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block one and so on. The basic block information for each instruction is used to validate the 
processor operation at runtime.  
The high level architecture of the address-based hardware security monitor system is 
illustrated in Figure 11. 
BRAM
Index
generator
≠ ?
32-bit 
processor
address 
Next
hop
Previous
Basic
block
FIFO
Error
Current
Basic
block
Next-hop
address
Basic
block
Current
Basic
block
rd_en
wr_en
Current basic
block
Previous
block
BRAM
BRAM index
Next Basic 
block
Basic 
block
≠ ?
FIFO
Controller
Error
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4
 
Figure 11: Address-based hardware security monitor architecture [2] 
3.2. Address-based hardware monitor operation 
The address-based hardware security monitor system is fashioned as a four stage 
pipeline. Each pipeline stage takes one clock cycle to complete. In the first stage the 
instruction address of the currently executed instruction in the processor is used to index a 
block RAM (BRAM). The BRAM outputs the basic block number of the instruction as well 
as the next-hop address, if there is one. In the second stage, we forward the basic block 
number to the third stage. At the same time, the basic block number output is stored in a 
FIFO block. During the third stage of the monitor operation, the current basic block number 
input from the second stage as well as the block information for the just completed 
instruction from the FIFO block are compared. If they are the same, the instructions belong to 
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the same basic block and the currently executed instruction is valid. If not, check if the 
instruction is within the next basic block, which is a valid basic block jump (e.g. jump from 
basic block 0 to basic block 1). If not, a check is required to determine whether the currently 
executed instruction belongs to the basic block which contains the target instruction for a 
jump. During the fourth stage the next-hop address for the just completed instruction is used 
to once again index the basic block memory. If the basic block for this target is the same as 
the basic block of the currently-executed instruction, a valid instruction sequence is 
determined. Otherwise, an error signal is generated to stop processor operation.  
3.2.1. System components 
3.2.1.1. BRAM index generator module 
The BRAM index generator module generates the index output to address the basic 
block memory (BRAM) from the 32-bit processor instruction address. The first instruction 
address from the processor represents address zero of the BRAM. This is used as the base 
address to generate remaining index outputs. 
3.2.1.2. FIFO controller module 
The FIFO controller module generates the write signal to store the current basic block 
information and the read signal to read the basic block information of the just completed 
instruction. 
3.2.1.3. Basic block memory (BRAM) 
Each element in the basic block memory (BRAM) corresponds to an instruction in the 
program sequence and is indexed by an instruction address of the application. The basic 
block memory contains two entries per index, the basic block number to which each 
instruction belongs and the next-hop address to where the instruction could jump. The next-
hop address entry is empty for unconditional instructions. 
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3.2.1.4. Basic block FIFO 
The basic block FIFO stores the basic block numbers of the just completed and 
currently executed instructions, as read from the basic block memory. These values are used 
to keep track of the processor execution path.  
3.3. Limitations of address-based hardware security monitor. 
The basic block monitoring strategy for tracking processor behavior does not directly 
validate individual instructions as they are executed by the processor. For example, malicious 
instructions can go undetected if the instructions belong to the same basic block as the 
expected instructions, as illustrated in Figure 12. In this example, malicious instructions (2 
and 3) will not be detected as long as they follow the program memory address execution 
sequence. Moreover, the inclusion of a next-hop address field, which is required only for 
branch instructions, with the basic block information for all instructions in the basic block 
memory increases on-chip memory utilization. To reduce memory utilization, the basic block 
memory can be shared using multiple read ports. For example, the basic block memory can 
be read simultaneously during both stage 4 and stage 1 of the pipeline. Such sharing does not 
allow basic block memory sharing across multiple hardware monitors when multiple network 
processor cores execute the same program. So, in multi-core network processor systems, 
separate address-based hardware security monitors need to be generated when the processors 
execute the same application. 
3.4. Programmable security monitor using instruction hashing 
The limitations of the fixed hardware security monitor motivate us to develop a new 
monitoring strategy which can validate individual instructions and reduce the embedded 
memory usage for the monitor.  
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Figure 12: Undetectable network attack 
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Figure 13: Programmable security monitor architecture 
3.4.1. Programmable logic monitor operation 
The operation of the programmable logic monitor relies on compile-time analysis of 
the program binary. An analysis tool determines the expected hash values for the binary and 
generates the Verilog files needed to synthesize the programmable security monitor, 
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including the jump logic. As shown in Figure 13, the programmable logic monitor 
infrastructure is fashioned as a three stage pipeline flow. Each 32-bit binary instruction 
executed by the processor is input to the monitor. The first stage of security monitor 
generates the four bit hash value from this 32-bit instruction. In the second stage, two parallel 
operations are performed. 
 The four bit hash value from the hash memory is fetched. 
 The hash value is evaluated in the jump module. If the hash value does not match one of 
the target hash values for the jump, an error signal is generated indicating that an 
incorrect instruction has been executed. 
In third stage, for unconditional instructions, a comparison is made between hash 
value computed from stage 1 and the value retrieved from hash memory. A reset signal is 
generated if there is a mismatch or if stage 2 generated an error signal.  
3.4.2. System components 
3.4.2.1. Hash function module 
The hash function module computes a multi-bit hash value for the 32-bit processor 
instruction. In our initial experimentation we use a hash function which generates a modulo-
16 value from the sum of all individual bits in the instruction to form a four-bit hash value. 
3.4.2.2. Hash memory module 
The hash memory module is a 2-port ROM block that stores the hash values generated 
during offline analysis. The hash values are used to keep track of processor behaviour during 
run time. 
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3.4.2.3. Jump logic module 
The jump logic module provides the next-hop hash memory addresses for branch 
instructions when a branch is taken. The processor typically executes three different types of 
instructions.  
1. An unconditional instruction is followed by execution of the next consecutive instruction 
in the processor memory.  
1. An unconditional branch instruction will result in a jump to a non-consecutive memory 
location in instruction memory. 
2. A conditional branch instruction can result in a jump to a new address location following 
the evaluation of the branch condition. If the branch is not taken, the next consecutive 
instruction is executed. 
Since a branch condition for a conditional branch instruction can only be evaluated at 
run time, both possible hash values for target address locations need to be considered by the 
jump logic module. During runtime, the hash values of the instruction after the conditional 
branch are compared with the possible hash values of the branch targets to determine if a 
valid instruction is being executed. The jump logic module then determines the address in the 
hash memory for the appropriate target instruction. 
3.4.2.4. Control module 
The control module (the multiplexer and +1 adder) determines the address for the 
hash memory. For unconditional instructions, the hash value for the next instruction is stored 
in the next consecutive address location. In case of conditional instructions, the address value 
for the hash memory is output from the jump module. 
3.4.2.5. Programmable security monitor advantages 
The key improvements of the programmable security monitor using instruction hashing over 
the address-based monitor include: 
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1. The programmable security monitor uses a hash of each instruction to monitor processor 
behaviour instead of storing basic block information for each instruction. A hash value is 
computed for each program instruction and stored in a hash memory. As instructions are 
executed, the hash of the currently-executed instruction is compared against a stored hash 
value for the instruction. The hash value of the first instruction is located in hash memory 
at location 0x0, the second at 0x1, and so forth. A state counter is used to point to the 
hash of the currently executed instruction. The strength of the monitoring scheme 
improves with hash value bit width since the probability of hash collisions (collision 
probability is 1/2
x
, where x is the number of bits) is reduced. To keep hardware 
requirements reasonable, the width of the hash values is constrained to the minimum size 
which allows the required security. A four-bit hash value is chosen for monitoring 
purposes as this size provides a strong monitoring pattern (collision probability 0.0625) 
which limits memory overhead. 
2. Next instruction addresses for conditional instructions are determined in the jump logic, 
reducing memory resource utilization. Combinational logic is used to determine the 
address of the next location in the hash memory for conditional instructions which are 
taken. For conditional instructions where a branch is not taken or for unconditional 
instructions, the next desired location in the hash memory is the next consecutive location 
in the memory.  
3. The design of the programmable security monitor allows for sharing of the hash memory 
monitoring resource. The hash values are stored in a 2-port ROM memory block which is 
utilized only once during each instruction evaluation cycle. The two ports allow for the 
sharing of the hash memory, a critical resource, by two monitors that are evaluating the 
same executing program. 
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3.5. Limitations of programmable security monitor 
The jump logic module can require significant logic resource utilization. The 
instruction at memory location 0 is a conditional jump instruction, with next-hop address 
location (1 or 4) evaluated based on the hash values (x and y). An offline analysis tool 
generates a state machine to perform this evaluation, initiated every time the memory address 
input is zero. Once a next state (1 or 4) is reached, the state machine will continue to 
evaluate. If there are n conditional branch instructions (with 2 next states), 2n possible state 
transitions need to be considered.  Additionally since the jump logic is implemented in logic, 
we need to re-synthesize the design for each different application. 
0
1
4
Reset
Memory 
address
x
y
0
1
2
3
4
5
x
y
Binary Offline analysis
 
Figure 14: Jump logic implementation 
3.6. Comparison of address-based hardware and programmable monitors 
3.6.1. Resource overhead 
We compared the resource utilization of the programmable security monitor to the 
address-based hardware security monitor technique. Table 1 provides the comparison results 
from MiBench [42][42] benchmarks and two other packet processing applications (IPV4 [39] 
and CM [40]). Since the next-hop addresses are not stored in block memory, the 
programmable security monitor approach results in a considerable reduction in memory 
utilization compared to the fixed hardware monitoring technique. The logic resources 
(ALUTs and registers) show a considerable increase in the programmable security monitor 
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approach with program size, which results from the jump logic implementation illustrated in 
Figure 14.   
 Instructions Address-based Monitor Programmable logic monitor 
Benchmark Total Control 
Flow 
ALUs Registers Memory 
bits 
ALUs Registers Memory 
bits 
Des 
factorial 
fir 
iquant 
IPV4(1core) 
CM (1core) 
IPV4(4core) 
CM(4core) 
739 
141 
175 
371 
327 
289 
327 
289 
15 
10 
13 
13 
17 
21 
17 
21 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
160 
160 
35 
33 
33 
34 
34 
34 
136 
136 
12416 
3200 
3200 
6272 
6272 
6272 
25088 
25088 
238 
217 
252 
314 
313 
329 
863 
974 
147 
137 
146 
170 
159 
167 
486 
529 
4096 
1024 
1024 
2048 
2048 
2048 
2048 
2048 
Table 1: Resource utilization comparison 
3.7. Memory based programmable security monitor approach 
This section presents an introduction to a memory based technique for representing 
hash based state machines. Figure 15 illustrates a hash based state machine. Here (0,1,2,3,4...) 
represent the states and (a,b,c,d...) represent the input (hash values) to the states. The state 
machine is traversed based on the current state and the hash input. 
Consider such a state machine with a two bit hash input. For any state there are at 
most four outgoing edges possible based on the input values (00, 01, 10, 11). A naïve way to 
store the state machine in RAM would be to store each state and all possible edge transitions 
as illustrated in Figure 16. The current state and the input hash pattern can be used to index 
the memory to find the next state transition. Since for most states, the next state transition 
may not be present for all input patterns, a valid bit is provided to verify the state transition. 
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For example in Figure 15, state 0 has only 1 state transition, state 2 hash 2 transitions, state3 
has 3 transitions and so on. 
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Figure 15: DFA state machine 
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Figure 16: DFA single memory representation 
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The memory representation illustrated in Figure 16 is not a cost effective solution 
since it results in a large number of unused memory locations. This is since there is a memory 
location for each possible input combination.  An alternative solution is to provide separate 
memory logic for multiple next states as illustrated in Figure 17. For example in Figure 15 , 
for states (0, 1 and 2) we index only a single memory (memory for one state). When state 2 is 
indexed, the jump bit (J) is set high to indicate more than 1 next state. In the next step we 
index all the parallel memory blocks (memory for multiple states) simultaneously. If the valid 
bit (V) is set and the hash input matches (either c or d), we move to the corresponding state 
(either 3 or 4). For a four bit hash input we need 16 parallel memory blocks.  
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Figure 17: DFA parallel memory representation 
The memory representation illustrated in Figure 17, requires simultaneous memory 
access (2
h
, where h is the input bit width) and in many cases there are unused memory 
locations. We need a compact solution which requires only single memory lookup during 
every state transition and does not result in unused memory locations. Thus, state transitions 
need to be implemented with no more than one memory access per instruction (to keep up 
with the network processor core) and be as compact as possible (to minimize the 
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implementation overhead of the monitor). In the next chapter we introduce the proposed 
security monitoring approach which presents a compact solution to represent a state machine 
in memory. 
3.8. Conclusion 
Based on the two monitoring techniques mentioned above, we outline the following 
important features of the two monitoring approaches:  
1. Four-bit instruction hashes can be utilized to monitor processor behaviour since it provides 
a compact representation for each instruction. 
2. It is desirable to limit or eliminate target instruction address locations for conditional 
branches. 
3. The evaluation circuitry for incorrect hash values should be efficiently implemented. In 
the programmable monitor case, this circuitry is implemented using combinational logic. 
In the next chapter, a memory-based implementation is presented.   
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CHAPTER 4 
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
In this chapter, we present a new high performance security monitor system for multi-
core network processors. The generation of security monitors for a multi-core system begins 
with the offline analysis of packet processing application binaries. In this chapter we describe 
an automated process to generate these binaries and configure available monitors fashioned 
from hardware. We implemented our prototype system as part of a reference router on the 
Altera DE4 NetFPGA platform. This chapter describes the individual components in the 
development of the prototype system. 
4.1. Memory based programmable security monitor architecture 
The high level view of our proposed memory based programmable security monitor 
architecture is illustrated in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18: Memory based programmable security monitor architecture 
 We introduce the following enhancements over the previous two security monitor 
models. 
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1. The processor operation is monitored using four-bit instruction hashes. The limitations of 
address-based hardware monitoring scheme, as explained in section 3.3, motivated this 
choice. This change allows the validation of individual instructions, and reduces the 
embedded memory usage of the monitor. 
2. The programmable security monitor scheme discussed in previous chapter suffers from 
logic increase in the jump logic unit due to a need to determine next hop addresses for the 
hash memory, as illustrated in section 3.5. Additionally it requires re-synthesizing the 
design for different application. In order to overcome these issues, we utilize a memory 
based approach to store hash values. This will provide for a more compact monitor 
solution. 
4.1.2. Memory based programmable security monitor operation 
The information that needs to be stored in the monitoring memory is illustrated on the 
left side of Figure 19. Each state represents an instruction and an outgoing transition edge 
from this state represents the hash value of the next expected instruction in the execution 
sequence. For example, the state c has two next states, d and e, with hash values 11 and 3, 
respectively. 
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Figure 19: Grouping of states 
Our main idea to compactly represent DFA states with varying numbers of outgoing 
edges is to encode all the necessary information in a single table entry and to group states by 
the number of outgoing edges. The main challenge in achieving compactness is to allocate 
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exactly the amount of memory that is needed for each state to store next state information 
while still being able to index this memory without degrading to a linear search. In our 
representation, we group states if they have same previous state. A state belongs to group g if 
the previous state has g outgoing edges. For a monitor with 4-bit hash value, there are 16 
possible groups. For example, in Figure 19 on the right side, groups are shown with different 
colors. Note that a state can belong to multiple groups (e.g., state f belongs to group 2 
(because a has two outgoing edges, one to b and one to f) and to group 3 (because e has three 
outgoing edges)). 
The memory contains tuples of {number of next states, offset in state group, valid 
hash values on outgoing edges} and is logically divided into groups. The base addresses for 
each group are stored in register file with 16 entries. Within a group the sets of states that 
share the previous state are grouped together (e.g., b and f are together and d and e are 
together). Within a set, states are ordered by the hash value on the incoming edge (e.g., e 
before d because hash value 3 is smaller than hash value 11). 
 To illustrate the operation of the monitor, we describe an example transition. As 
shown in Figure 18, each 32-bit binary instruction executed by the processor is also input to 
our security monitor during the fetch stage of the processor. Assume the monitor is in state a 
and the processor reports an instruction that leads to a hash value of 7. To perform the 
transition, the memory row labeled a is read. The tuple in this row indicates that there are two 
outgoing edges. The valid hash values of these two edges are stored in the 16-bit vector. To 
verify that the transition is valid, the hash comparison unit checks if bit 7 is set in the bit 
vector (which it is). If this bit is not set, then an invalid transition takes place, indicating an 
attack, and the processor is reset. After the check, the next state (i.e., state f) in the DFA 
needs to be found in memory. To determine the address of that state, the base address of the 
group of the next state is looked up in the register file (i.e., 0x002 since the next state belongs 
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to group 2). To this base address, the product of the set size (i.e., group number) and the 
offset in the state group is added (to index the correct set within this group). Finally, k is 
added, which is the position of the matching hash in the bit vector (in our case 1 since 2 is the 
first matching hash (i.e., k=0) and 7 is the second matching hash (i.e., k=1)). Thus the 
memory location of state f is 0x002 + 2*0 + 1 = 0x003.  
Note that any state transition takes only one memory read from state machine memory 
and a lookup into a fixed-size register file. The DFA is represented compactly without 
wasting any memory slots. Thus, this representation lends itself to high-performance 
implementation. 
4.1.3. System components 
4.1.3.1. Hash function module 
The hash function module generates the four bit hash value for the 32-bit processor 
instruction. For our experimentation, we used a hash function which generates a modulo-16 
value from the sum of all individual bits in the instruction. 
4.1.3.2. Group base address module 
The group base address module stores the base address of the different groups in the 
state machine memory module. The number of states value read from memory is used to 
index the group base address module. The corresponding base address value output is 
forwarded to the memory index generation module. 
4.1.3.3. Valid bit generation module 
This module compares the 4-bit hash value generated by the hash function module 
with all the read hash values from the memory to determine the position of the matching hash 
value. If no hash match occurs, an error signal is generated. 
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4.1.3.4. Memory index generation module 
  This module generates the memory address for indexing the state machine memory 
module. The general equation for memory index calculation is base address + number of 
states*offset in state group + k. The base address value is generated by the group base 
address module, number of states and offset in state group values are read from memory and 
k is generated by the valid bit generation module 
4.1.3.5. State machine memory module 
The state machine memory module stores the hash values and next state values in a 
compact manner as explained in section 4.1.2. The RAM block is divided into different 
groups, which store the states having same number of next states. Each memory entry 
contains tuples of {number of states, offset in state group, valid hash values on outgoing 
edges}. For our experimentation we selected a 4096 deep RAM block as the state machine 
memory module. So the total size of the state machine memory block is 4096*(4+12+16) = 
131K memory bits. 
4.2. Offline analysis 
The automated offline analysis tool for security monitor generation is illustrated in 
Figure 20. The application source code is first passed through a MIPS-GCC compiler. The 
compiler generates the 32-bit binary information for each instruction and the branch 
information for conditional instructions. The branch information contains all possible target 
addresses for the conditional instruction. In our current implementation, all possible branch 
targets and return instructions are analyzed at compile time. Then the DFA-to-NFA 
conversion starts with a non-deterministic NFA representation obtained from the compiler 
information. Through powerset construction, a DFA is constructed. This DFA is then 
converted into a memory initialization file and is loaded into the monitor when the processing 
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binary is installed in the processor.  The NFA to DFA conversion module will be explained in 
detail in section 4.3. 
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Figure 20: Offline analysis 
 
4.3. Non deterministic finite automata to deterministic finite automata 
Tracking nondeterministic finite automata is difficult to implement in practice since 
the automaton can have multiple active states. This leads to high bandwidth requirements 
between the monitoring logic and the memory that maintains the NFA since next-state 
information for all active states has to be fetched in each iteration. As illustrated in Figure 21, 
state 4 and 6 can be reached from state 3 for input condition (z). When using a DFA, in 
contrast, only one state is active and implementation becomes much easier. During offline 
analysis, state assignments must be made so that the control flow is distinct.  
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Figure 21: NFA state machine 
 Powerset construction [50] is a standard method used to convert an NFA to a DFA. 
The algorithm for NFA to DFA transformation using powerset construction is illustrated in 
Figure 22.  
1. The algorithm begins by constructing an NFA state machine, with the each state node 
having the following elements: number of inputs, number of outputs, input list and output 
list (for example state 3 has number of inputs: 1, number of outputs: 2, input list: [state 2] 
and output list: [state 4, state 6]).  
2. The algorithm then progresses to check for conditional branch instructions (number of 
outputs > 1). In the NFA state machine in Figure 21, states 2, 3, 4 and 7 satisfy this 
condition. 
3. The algorithm then proceeds to check for states exhibiting NFA property (hash1 = hash2). 
In the above example state 3 has two output states (4 and 6) both reachable by the same 
input (z), which represents the hash value of the next state. The algorithm replaces states 4 
and 6 in the output list of state 3 with a new single state ({4, 6}), distinct for the input 
value (z). The node elements of the states involved are updated (state 3 now has number of 
inputs: 1, number of outputs: 1, input list: [state 2] and output list: [state {4, 6}]. Similarly 
new state {4, 6} has number of inputs: 1, number of outputs: 2, input list: [state 3] and 
output list: [state 5, state 7]).  
4.  This procedure is continued until all outputs of the present state (if there are more than 2 
outputs) and all states of the NFA state machine are traversed. Both state 3 and new state 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
x y z
a
x y x b
a
z
9
a
c
NFA
36 
 
{4, 6} exhibit NFA properties (for input values z and x respectively). This results in two 
additional states being included in the DFA state machine (state {4, 6} and state {5, 7}). 
The resulting DFA transformation using Powerset construction for the above NFA 
example is shown in Figure 23. 
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Figure 22: Powerset construction algorithm 
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In Figure 23, the states (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9...) in the state machine represent the 
address locations of the hash memory. The hash values (0000 to 1111) are represented by the 
inputs to the state machine (x, y, z, a, b, c...).  
 
 
Figure 23: DFA state machine using powerset construction 
 
The NFA to DFA transformation using powerset construction can result in states 
having more than two next-hop values (e.g. {5, 7}). The proposed security monitor 
architecture described in section 4.1 needs to be enhanced to support multiple next-hop 
address lookups. As part of the proposed work we will evaluate possible modifications to the 
CAM module to accommodate these multiple next-hop address lookups. This transformation 
is performed during offline analysis using software to convert the NFA state machine 
representation to a DFA representation.  
4.4. Network processor core 
The high level architecture of our network processor core is illustrated in Figure 24. 
The processor core consists of a 32-bit open source embedded Plasma processor [38] which is 
implemented in Verilog HDL and based on the MIPS architecture. The Plasma processor 
executes all MIPS user mode instructions except unaligned load and store instructions. The 
network processor core has a memory unit for storing program binaries and for storing data 
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during program execution.  It also has packet buffers to store the incoming network packet 
data. 
 
Figure 24: Network processor core 
 
The network processor core integrated with a single security monitor system is shown 
in Figure 25. The security monitor keeps track of the instructions executed by the processor 
core. A reset signal is generated when a malicious behavior is detected.  
 
Figure 25: Network processor integrated with security monitor 
4.5. Network processor architecture 
A high level overview of the single-core network processor system with the security 
monitor incorporated in the Altera DE4 NetFPGA pipeline is illustrated in Figure 26. The 
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packets arrive at the four Ethernet ports on DE4 board and are inserted into input queues 
(MAC RX Q). The input arbiter forwards these packets to the flow classification module. The 
flow classifier module assigns the incoming packet data to the network processor core. The 
instructions executed by the processor core are input to the monitor subsystem 
simultaneously. The security monitor can generate reset signal to the network processor core. 
The processed packets are forwarded by the output arbiter to the output queues. The packets 
output from the processor system are forwarded by the output queues to the corresponding 
MAC transmit ports (MAC TX Q). 
 
Figure 26: Single-core network processor system with security monitor in Altera DE4 
NetFPGA pipeline.  
 
4.6. Von Neumann versus Harvard architecture 
The MIPS plasma processor used in our proposed network processor design utilizes a 
von Neumann [46] memory architecture, as illustrated in Figure 27. In a von Neumann 
architecture, a single physical memory is shared by both code and data. The processor does 
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not make any distinction between whether the data or code is read or written. A memory 
interface arbitrates the memory access between the instruction read and data access.  
 
Figure 27: von Neumann architecture 
 
This implementation style of von Neumann architecture makes it inherently 
vulnerable to code injection [48] attacks. A typical code injection attack is illustrated in 
Figure 28. The processor keeps track of the instructions it executes using the program counter. 
In a code injection attack, an attacker initially injects a malicious code into the processor’s 
address space and directs the program counter to the address space where the malicious code 
resides. Attackers often employ different memory error techniques like stack overflow [52], 
format string vulnerability [53] and integer overflow [54] to trigger code injection attacks.  
 
Figure 28: Code injection attack 
In a Harvard architecture [47], the code and data are placed in separate physical 
address spaces. The Harvard memory architecture is illustrated in Figure 29. Separate buses 
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provide instruction and data access, with each potentially having different word widths, 
timing and memory address structures. The processor can perform both the instruction read 
and the data memory access at the same time. The instructions are usually stored in read only 
memory while data is stored in read-write memory. Since a program counter cannot point to 
addresses in the data memory, code injection attacks are difficult to perform in a Harvard 
memory architecture. Even if an attacker successfully writes a malicious code in the stack, it 
will not be executed.  
 
Figure 29: Harvard architecture 
 
Even though general memory error techniques (integer overflow, heap overflow etc.) 
cannot be used to generate code injection attacks, Francillon et al. [49] demonstrated that 
code injection attacks are still feasible on Harvard architecture processors using return-
oriented programming technique [55]. Here an attacker sends several specifically crafted 
packets to build a malicious stack one byte at a time. Once the stack is built, the attacker 
sends another specifically crafted packet that copies the malware to program memory using a 
return-oriented programming technique. 
As part of the proposed work we evaluated a possible attack on a Harvard architecture 
and the ability of our proposed security monitor to detect it. The memory architecture of the 
CPU
Address
Data
Data Memory
Instruction
Data
Stack
Instructions
Address
Instuction 
Memory
42 
 
plasma processor was modified to have separate instruction and data memory. The instruction 
memory was made read-only while data memory was made read-write.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 
This chapter describes the experimental approach used for testing the prototype 
system. In the first section, we describe how a Harvard architecture attack can be constructed 
for the networking environment. The later section discusses the experimental setup, 
implemented utilizing Altera DE4 NetFPGA infrastructure. Finally, we outline the different 
evaluation metrics used for verifying the prototype system functionality.  
5.1.  Network attack generation 
In this section, we describe how a Harvard memory architecture attack can be 
constructed for the networking environment and how our monitor can detect it. Figure 31 
shows a portion of congestion management protocol (CM) and IPV4 packet forwarding 
application used to build an attack on the network processor system. The network attack used 
for testing the prototype system functionality exploits a simple integer overflow vulnerability 
of the congestion management [40] protocol application. A congestion management protocol 
inserts a custom protocol header in the packet header space between IP header and UDP 
header as illustrated in Figure 30.  
Link
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Figure 30: Congestion management header insertion 
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The application during this process needs to make sure the new packet size (len1 + 
len2) does not exceed the maximum datagram length. In certain cases, this maximum packet 
size check can be exploited to create an integer overflow.  
CM protocol IPV4 application
 
Figure 31: Integer overflow vulnerable code 
The variable sum is of type unsigned short. The CM application uses this variable to 
check whether the packet size (sum = len1 + len2) after inserting the custom header has 
exceeded the maximum packet size limit (sum > MAX_PKT_SIZE). Any packet which 
satisfies the size check is then copied to processor data memory. However, an attacker can 
send a carefully crafted malformed UDP packet that can trigger an integer overflow. For 
example, an attack packet with malformed UDP length field (16 bit value 0xfffe (decimal 
value 65534)) will pass the maximum packet size check (since 65334 + 12 = 10, due to 
integer overflow). This will result in 65334 bytes of packet data to be copied to the processor 
memory space.   
The packet payload of the attack packet is crafted in such a way that the return 
address is overwritten to direct the control flow to the IPV4 packet forwarding application 
(which is the library code on the processor) and the value of ip_dst_low field is 0xff. The port 
information gets updated with this value (the boxed instruction in the IPV4 code), forwarding 
the attack packet to all the outgoing ports and then crashing the processor system. As a result, 
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the attack packet gets forwarded to all outgoing interfaces before the system crashes, thus 
propagating the attack through the network. 
5.2. Experimental Setup 
The test topology that will be used to verify the performance of our monitoring 
system is shown in Figure 32.  
 
Figure 32: Test topology 
Altera DE4 packet generator is used to generate network packets, and to capture 
packets forwarded from the prototype system. The packet generator tool allows for 
customizing the size, the number of iterations, and the throughput rate for the test packet. The 
packet generator code is downloaded to one Altera DE4 board. The single core network 
processor system with security monitor, integrated along with the Altera DE4 NetFPGA 
packet generator pipeline is downloaded to another DE4 board. Ethernet MAC-PHY registers 
are configured through the JTAG cable. The experimental test setup is illustrated in Figure 33. 
 
Figure 33: Experimental test setup 
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5.3. Evaluation metrics 
The prototype system is tested in simulation using a ModelSim-Altera simulator [41], 
and in hardware using an Altera Signal-tap logic generator [56]. The different evaluation 
metrics for verifying the prototype system are listed below. 
1. Throughput performance: Using IPV4 packet forwarding application [39], the single-
core network processor system without that security monitor is tested for throughput 
performance for different packet sizes. The single core network processor system with 
security monitor illustrated in Figure 26 is tested for throughput performance using the 
attack model described in section 5.1.  
2. Attack Detection: The prototype system described in Figure 26 is tested for attack 
detection capability, using the attack model mentioned in section 5.1. The security monitor 
system should detect any unintended processor behaviour and trigger appropriate recovery 
mechanisms to the processor.   
3. Resource overhead: The resource utilization of the security monitor system is evaluated 
using a diverse set of network applications, as explained in next chapter. The resource 
savings facilitated by the proposed security approach over existing monitoring schemes is 
estimated. 
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CHAPTER 6 
BENCHMARKS AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
In this chapter we discuss the benchmarks used for testing the network processor 
system and the results of the experiments performed on the proposed security monitor 
architecture.  
6.1. Evaluation benchmarks 
Network workloads can be logically divided into data plane workloads and control 
plane workloads. The data plane is where data traffic is handled using actions such as packet 
forwarding, packet dropping, and encapsulation. The control plane handles complex packet 
management tasks like flow management, signaling, and routing updates. Control plane 
operations are usually less time critical, while data plane operations take place in real time on 
the network data path. Although network processors mostly target data plane applications, 
they are equally applicable to control plane operations.  NpBench [43] is a benchmark suite 
targeting modern network processor applications. The benchmark applications are 
categorized into three specific functional groups - traffic management and quality of service 
group (TQG), security and media processing group (SMG) and packet processing group 
(PPG). The applications in these groups belong to either the data plane, control plane or both.  
The TQG benchmark falls in the category of both control plane and data plane processing, 
and includes applications related to routing, scheduling, switching, signaling and quality of 
service. The SMG benchmark is related to security applications like firewalls, admission 
control, encryption algorithms and media processing applications like media trans-coding. 
The PPG benchmark includes data plane processing applications like IP packet fragmentation, 
packet marking, editing and classification. The proposed network processor architecture will 
be evaluated using these diverse benchmark applications. Table 2 summarizes the different 
benchmarks provided by NpBench.  
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Group Applications Data 
plane 
Control 
plane 
 
 
 
 
TQG 
Routing X X 
Scheduling X X 
Content-based Switching X X 
Weighted pair queuing X X 
Traffic shaping X X 
Load Balancing X X 
VLAN  X 
MPLS X X 
 
 
 
 
SMG 
Block cipher algorithm X  
Message cipher algorithm X  
Firewall application X X 
IPSec X X 
Virtual private network X X 
Public encryption X  
Usage-based accounting X X 
H.323 X  
Media transcoding X X 
Duplicate data suppression X  
 
 
PPG 
IP-packet fragmentation X  
Packet encapsulation X  
Packet marking/editing X  
Packet classification X  
Checksum calculation X  
Table 2: NpBench Benchmark applications [43]. 
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6.2. Experimental results 
6.2.1. Attack Detection 
This section explains the experiments performed to test the ability of our proposed 
security monitoring system to detect and recover from an attack. We observed the security 
monitor operation in simulation using the ModelSim-Altera simulator [41], and in hardware 
using an Altera Signal-tap logic generator [56]. 
6.2.1.1. Network processor without security monitor 
We initially tested the single-core network processor operation without the security 
monitor system when the attack described in section 5.1 is implemented. Figure 34 shows the 
simulation results for the behavior of the processor system. The attack packet was received 
through MAC port Rx0, and then forwarded to the network processor. The processor then 
forwards the attack packet to all the outgoing ports of the router and then crashes the router. 
This behavior was also verified in hardware. 
 
Figure 34: Simulation waveform showing attack packet propagation in the network 
processor system.   
6.2.1.2. Network processor with security monitor 
We then repeated the previous experiment after including the security monitor as 
illustrated in Figure 26. Figure 35 shows the simulation results for the behavior of the 
network processor system when an attack packet and normal packet are sent simultaneously. 
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After the monitor was included, the attack packet was successfully identified, the network 
processor was reset, and subsequent normal packets were routed successfully.  
 
Figure 35: Simulation waveform showing the identification of the attack packet and 
successful forwarding of the subsequent packet. 
6.2.2. Throughput performance 
This section explains the experiments performed to measure the throughput of our 
proposed network processor system. The experimental setup mentioned in section 5.2 was 
implemented to perform these measurements. 
6.2.2.1. Single-core network processor throughput performance 
The single-core network processor system illustrated in Figure 26 was implemented, 
without the security monitor, on the Altera DE4 NetFPGA platform. Using a standard IPV4 
packet forwarding application in the processor core, the throughput performance of the 
single-core system was tested. Network packets of different packet sizes were generated from 
the Altera DE4 packet generator, and send through the 1Gbps MAC ports of the Altera DE4 
board. The forwarded packets were received back at the packet generator and the prototype 
system’s transmit-receive statistics were measured. The resulting throughput performance is 
illustrated in Figure 36. 
The throughput of our network processor system improves as the packet size increases. 
The packet forwarding application works by comparing destination IP address in each packet 
header with IP address values stored in processor memory to select an output port. A 
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reduction in packet size increases the per packet processing operation, and thus reduces the 
overall throughput performance. 
 
Figure 36: Single-core network processor throughput performance (IPV4) 
6.2.2.2. Single-core network processor throughput performance under attack 
In this experiment, we evaluate the throughput performance of our single-core 
network processor system illustrated in Figure 26 when attack packets are sent 
simultaneously along with normal packets. Normal packets are received at one Ethernet-
MAC port (Rx0) of the network processor system; while attack packets are received 
simultaneously at another receive port (Rx1). Both normal packets and attack packets are 
generated at the same rate from the packet generator system. The forwarded packets are 
received back at the packet generator and the throughput is measured. Figure 38 shows the 
throughput performance of the network processor system for two different packet sizes for 
varying ratios of normal packets to attack packets. The vulnerable application shown in 
Figure 31 was used for testing purpose. When no attack packets are send the throughput of 
the network processor system increases and reaches a maximum. When attack packets are 
included the throughput reaches a maximum, and then decreases slightly before settling down. 
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Figure 37: Single-core network processor throughput performance with security 
monitor under attack packets 
As we increase the ratio of the attack packets sent to the processor system, the overall 
throughput of the system is reduced. This effect occurs because whenever an attack packet is 
detected, the security monitor generates a reset signal. The network processor and the packet 
buffer are reset before the processor can continue with the next packet. 
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Figure 38: Maximum possible input rate for all normal packets to be forwarded 
successfully 
Figure 38 shows the maximum rate at which packets can be received by the network 
processor system so that all normal packets are forwarded successfully. Only attack packets 
are dropped by the processor, while all the regular packets are forwarded successfully. The 
latency for the 100-byte packet is 24us while for 256-byte packet the latency is 104us. 
When testing the throughput performance using larger packet sizes (512 bytes, 1500 
bytes), the network processor does not forward the packets and the packets are lost. The 
reason for this packet loss could be either of the following two cases below. 
1. For the application used for testing throughput performance under attack (CM protocol), 
the processor copies the packets to the data memory before forwarding the packets. The 
data memory may not be sufficient for processing large packets. So we may need to look 
at different applications to overcome this problem. 
2. Packet generator sends packets to the network processor with a small inter packet delay. 
Since CM application operates on the entire packet, the inter packet delay becomes 
insufficient (as packet size increases) for the single core processor to effectively route the 
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packets, resulting in packet loss.  A solution for this could be multi-core network 
processors. 
6.2.3. Resource Utilization 
This section explains the different resource utilization details of our proposed network 
processor system. The synthesis results were provided by Altera Quartus tool while the DFA 
memory resource utilization details were provided by the offline analysis tool explained in 
section 4.2. 
6.2.3.1. Hash size and memory requirement 
We initially explored the relation between hash size, DFA states, and state machine 
memory requirement for three different hash sizes. Table 3 shows the relation between hash 
size and DFA states. As hash size increases the probability of hash collision decreases (1/2
h
, 
where h is the hash size), which reduces the number of DFA states. For example, for a three 
bit hash, if the sum of instruction bits for the multiple active states on the output of a control 
flow instruction in an NFA differ by a value of 8, we combine them to form a DFA state (e.g., 
if the sums are 2 and 10, then modulo 8 of both values is 2). When we move to higher hash 
sizes, this hash collision is avoided and the DFA states get reduced. For the benchmarks 
tested, most of the NFA states combined to form DFA have the same hash value, so they 
remain even when we increase the hash size. For the few states where hash collisions are 
avoided, we get a reduction in DFA states by increasing the hash size. 
Table 4 shows the relationship between hash size and state machine memory. 
Increasing the hash size increases the size of memory entries exponentially since the valid 
hash values on outgoing edges field depends on hash size as explained in section 4.1. The 
memory overhead increases by 42% as we move from three bit hash to four bit hash and by 
56% as we move from four bit hash to five bit hash. Having a larger hash size reduces the 
number of DFA states (probability of hash collision reduces) when the benchmark has a 
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potentially large number of control flow instructions and memory accesses. We selected a 
four bit hash for our proposed security monitoring system since it provides sufficiently low 
collision probability (0.0625) without much memory overhead.  
 
Benchmarks NFA states DFA states 
  Three bit hash Four bit hash Five bit hash 
frag 573 594 592 591 
red 802 808 808 807 
ssld 828 836 836 833 
wfq 905 921 921 918 
mtc 2427 2460 2460 2459 
Table 3: Hash size versus DFA states 
 
Benchmarks NFA states Three bit hash Four bit hash Five bit hash 
  Mem. 
entries 
Mem. 
bits 
Mem. 
entries 
Mem. 
bits 
Mem. 
entries 
Mem. 
bits 
frag 573 629 13209 627 18810 626 29422 
red 802 857 17997 857 25710 854 40138 
ssld 828 879 18459 879 26340 871 40937 
wfq 905 980 20580 978 29340 969 45543 
mtc 2427 2584 59432 2584 82688 2581 126469 
Table 4: Hash size versus state machine memory 
6.2.3.2. DFA versus NFA monitoring graph comparison 
The results of generating instruction-level monitoring graphs for both our approach 
and the previously mentioned approach in section 3.1 are illustrated in Table 5. The number 
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of entries in the state machine memory is shown in the Mem. entries column. A clear benefit 
of our proposed approach is speed. In all cases, only one access to the monitor memory is 
required for any benchmark (including the five shown here). The previous NFA-based 
approach requires up to three memory accesses for the benchmarks tested and potentially up 
to 16 for other benchmarks. The conversion from NFA to a DFA does incur a memory 
overhead of 7.7% on average for the benchmarks. 
 
 Chasaki[2] Proposed system 
Net. 
application 
No: of 
instructions 
NFA states Max mem. 
accesses 
DFA states Mem. 
entries 
Mem. 
overhead 
frag 573 573 3 592 627 9.4% 
red 802 802 2 808 857 6.8% 
ssld 828 828 3 836 879 6.2% 
wfq 905 905 2 921 978 8.0% 
mtc 2427 2427 3 2460 2584 6.4% 
Table 5: Evaluation of monitoring approaches for our proposed DFA approach and a 
previous NFA approach.  
6.2.3.3. Monitoring speed and resource utilization 
The network processor system along with the security monitoring module was 
successfully implemented on the DE4 platform.  The lookup table (LUT), flip flop (FF), and 
memory resources required for the single network processor core, monitor, and other 
interface circuitry for the router (e.g. buffers, input arbiter, queuing control) are shown in 
Table 6. The NP memory includes space for up to 4096 monitor memory entries. All circuitry 
operated at 125 MHz, the same clock speed for the system without the monitor.  
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Resources  Secure monitor Network proc. DE4 interface Available 
LUTs 140 3,792 37,803 182,400 
FFs 26 2,120 38,444 182,400 
Mem. bits 131,072 201,216 2,550,800 14,625,792 
Table 6: Resource utilization for single core network processor system 
 
The lookup table (LUT), flip flop (FF), and memory resources required for both our 
approach and the previously mentioned approach in section 3.1 are illustrated in Table 7. The 
security monitor memory includes space for up to 4096 memory entries. The DFA based 
monitor has the advantage of evaluating 16 next states during every instruction cycle.   
 
Resources NFA based security 
monitor (basic blocks) 
DFA based security 
monitor (4-bit hash) 
LUTs 40 140 
FFs 35 26 
Memory bits 49,664 131,072 
Table 7: Resource utilization comparison between NFA based and DFA based security 
monitors 
 
This chapter summarized the evaluation benchmarks and the experimental results 
performed to test the functionality of our proposed network processor with the security 
monitoring system. Next chapter concludes the thesis and provides future directions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The thesis has outlined a new network processor architecture with a high-performance 
security monitor for detecting in-network attacks. The network processor requires only a 
single memory lookup per network processor instruction. This single memory lookup is 
maintained regardless of the complexity of the network processor program using NFA-to-
DFA translation of the monitoring graph. Our monitor, which tracks individual processor 
instructions, has been verified in hardware using a network processor with a Harvard 
architecture. The presence of monitoring does not slow down the processor operation since it 
is performed outside the operational paths of the processor. 
The network processor with security monitoring system was implemented as part of 
the Altera DE4 NetFPGA infrastructure. Results show that the throughput of the single-core 
network processor system increases as the packet size increases. The network processor was 
able to achieve line rate forwarding at packet size of 1500 bytes for IPV4 packet forwarding 
application. We demonstrated the ability of our security monitor system to detect and recover 
from network attacks without affecting the performance of the processor. Only the attack 
packets get dropped, while the regular packets are forwarded successfully. We illustrated the 
benefits of our security monitoring system over existing techniques in both memory access 
and resource utilization. Our evaluation of hash size to memory resource requirement showed 
that a four bit hash size provides sufficiently less collision probability without increasing the 
memory overhead.  
In the future, we plan to evaluate our monitoring approach using a multi-core network 
processor. We also plan to look into the possibility of sharing monitoring logic between 
different processor cores when they execute the same application. We hope that the 
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developed security monitor framework will facilitate rapid design space exploration of 
security monitor architectures for network processor systems. 
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